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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Regan Mojok Adeng appeals from the judgment of the district court, 
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony possession of a 
controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and 
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.  
 On appeal, Adeng argues the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress statements he made to officers during the investigation.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Officer Canfield and Officer Martinez responded to an early morning call 
regarding a potential domestic battery occurring at a Boise Maverick service 
station.  (R., p. 79.)  The caller reported that a man and a woman were struggling 
over a purse.  (Id.)  When the officers arrived at the Maverick station, they made 
contact with Adeng in the parking lot.  (Id.)  Adeng matched the physical 
description of the man involved in the struggle over the purse.  (Id.)  Adeng was 
in close proximity to a woman’s purse that was laying on the ground.  (Id.)   
Officer Martinez saw Adeng trying to move away from the purse when the 
police arrived.  (Id.)  Officer Canfield instructed Adeng to sit on the curb while the 
officers investigated the report.  (Id.)  Adeng was not placed in handcuffs.  (R., 
pp. 79-80.)  The patrol cars’ emergency lights were not activated.  (R., p. 80.)   
 Officer Canfield questioned Adeng regarding the location and identity of 
the woman involved in the struggle.  (Id.)  While Adeng was calm and respectful, 
he was “fairly uncooperative in his responses” because Adeng “consistently 
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refused to provide the woman’s name or state her whereabouts.”  (Id.; see also 
Ex. A at 0:00 – 8:05.1)  Adeng eventually acknowledged there had been an 
altercation with a female friend, but denied any wrongdoing.  (R., p. 80.)  
 After searching, the police located the woman locked inside the restroom 
of the Maverick store.  (Id.)  The woman had locked herself in the restroom.  (Id.)  
She was identified as Sara Cummings.  (Id.; see also Ex. A at 8:05 – 10:50.)  
Officer Canfield interviewed Ms. Cummings about the reported struggle.  (R., p. 
80.)  Ms. Cummings confirmed that she had argued with Adeng, and she denied 
that Adeng had committed any crime against her.  (Id.)   
 During the interview with Ms. Cummings, the officers observed that Ms. 
Cummings had a fat lip.  (R., p. 81.)  The injury appeared recent.  (Id.)  Officer 
Canfield questioned Adeng about Ms. Cummings’ injury.  (Id.; see also Ex. A at 
13:53 – 19:11.)  Eventually, Adeng acknowledged that he did have a physical 
altercation with Ms. Cummings.  (R., p. 81.)  Adeng admitted that his forearm 
connected with Ms. Cummings’ mouth, but Adeng claimed it was done in self-
defense.  (Id.)  Officer Canfield then spoke with Ms. Cummings regarding 
Adeng’s account of her injury.  (Id.; see also Ex. A. at 19:25 – 21:00.)  Ms. 
Cummings admitted there had been a physical altercation with Adeng but she 
did not want to press charges against Adeng.  (R., p. 81.)   
 “Officer Canfield then conversed again with [Adeng], and informed him, 
without providing any specifics, that ‘she’s telling a story over there’ and the 
                                            
1 Exhibit A is the audio recording of the encounter and was admitted into 
evidence at the suppression hearing.  (See 10/14/14 Tr., p. 42, L. 18 – p. 43, L. 
16.)  The times of the recording are estimates.   
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police would have to believe her if the defendant continued being evasive (plainly 
implying that Ms. Cumming’s [sic] account of events contradicted [Adeng’s]).”  
(Id.; see also Ex. A at 21:00 – 25:00.)  “Officer Canfield pointed out that the 
evidence looked bad for [Adeng], in that Ms. Cummings was obviously injured 
and her purse had been found abandoned in such a manner that it appeared the 
defendant had wrongfully taken possession of it in the course of a possible 
battery.”  (R., p. 81.)  Officer Canfield asked Adeng if he had any property 
belonging to Ms. Cummings on his person.  (Id.; see also Ex. A at 26:45 – 
29:20.)  Specifically, Officer Canfield asked whether Adeng had any items that 
would have come from her purse and whether Adeng would allow the officers to 
search his person for any such property.  (R., p. 81.)     
 Adeng initially refused to grant consent to search his person because he 
did not want to get Ms. Cummings into trouble.  (Id.)  The officers continued to 
question Adeng about what might be on his person that would get Ms. 
Cummings into trouble.  (Id.)  At this point Adeng’s behavior began to make the 
officers nervous.  (R., pp. 81-82; see also Ex. A at 29:02 – 31:10.)  Officer 
Canfield instructed Adeng not to reach into his pockets.  (R., pp. 81-82.)  Officer 
Canfield asked Adeng if he would consent to be patted down for weapons.  (R., 
p. 82; see also Ex. A at 31:05 – 31:20.)  Adeng consented to be patted down for 
weapons.  (R., p. 82.)  During the pat search Officer Canfield restrained Adeng’s 
hands.  (Id.)  The officers told Adeng that he was not under arrest.  (Ex. A at 
31:15 – 31:21.)   
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During the pat search, Officer Canfield felt an object in one of Adeng’s 
pockets and asked Adeng what it was.  (R., p. 82; see also Ex. A at 31:20 – 
31:45.)  Adeng eventually conceded he had a pipe.  (R., p. 82; see also Ex. A at 
33:46 – 34:50.)  With that admission, the officers retrieved the pipe, and arrested 
Adeng for possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp. 82-83.)  Adeng was placed 
into handcuffs and placed in the back of a patrol car.  (Id.)  During the search 
incident to arrest, the officers located drugs and paraphernalia.  (R., p. 83.)  
Adeng was read Miranda2 warnings.  (Id.; see also Ex. A at 39:15 – 40:20.)   
The state charged Adeng with one count of felony possession of a 
controlled substance, two counts of misdemeanor possession of a controlled 
substance, and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.  
(R., pp. 34-35.)   
 Adeng filed a motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 49-50, 53-59.)  Adeng argued 
that he was in custody when he was questioned about the pipe and thus his 
statements should be suppressed because he was not given Miranda warnings 
at that time.  (R., pp. 54-55.)  The state objected.  (R., pp. 62-68.)  The district 
court held a hearing on Adeng’s motion to suppress.  (R., p. 69.)   
Officer Canfield testified that he and Martinez responded to the Maverick 
gas station for a possible domestic disturbance between a male and a female.  
(10/14/14 Tr., p. 7, L. 13 – p. 8, L. 13.)  Officer Frederick arrived shortly after 
Officer Canfield and Officer Martinez.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-25.)  None of 
the police cars had their emergency lights or overhead lights on.  (10/14/14 Tr., 
                                            
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
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p. 9, Ls. 12-18, p. 50, Ls. 1-3.)  The Maverick store was open and there were 
people in the store and at the gas pumps.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 19-25.)  
When Officer Canfield asked Adeng to sit down, Officer Canfield did not 
physically restrain Adeng.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 31, L. 16 – p. 32, L. 3.)  At no time 
did Officer Canfield touch Adeng, until the pat search.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 
19-23.)  Adeng was not free to leave during the investigation.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 
10, Ls. 19-24.)  Officer Canfield testified he had dealt with Adeng before, and 
Officer Canfield noted that Adeng was acting surprisingly quiet and his 
“demeanor was a little bit different this time than normal.”  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 10, 
Ls. 3-12.)  Officer Canfield testified that he was aware that Adeng had been 
violent with officers in the past.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 2-11.)   
Officer Martinez also testified.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 46, L. 24 – p. 66, L. 2.)  
Officer Martinez testified that when the officers arrived on scene, they did not 
know whether it was a fight, or a kidnapping, or if there were injuries.  (10/14/14 
Tr., p. 50, Ls. 10-21.)  Officer Martinez was also familiar with Adeng, and he also 
noted that Adeng was not acting “normal.”  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 53, L. 15 – p. 54, L. 
4.)  Officer Martinez testified that, even though it was very early in the morning, 
the Maverick station was open for business and there were quite a few people 
going in and out of the Maverick station.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 59, L. 15 – p. 60, L. 
10.)  The whole parking lot was lit up.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 60, Ls. 11-23.)  None of 
the officers ever drew their weapons.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 61, L. 17 – p. 62, L. 2.)  
Nor did Officer Martinez lay his hands on Adeng.  (10/14/14 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 9-18.)   
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The district court denied Adeng’s motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 78-89.)  
The district court made substantial factual findings based upon the testimony 
and evidence introduced at the hearing, including the recorded audio of the 
officers’ interactions with Adeng.  (R., pp. 78-83; Ex. A.)  The district court 
analyzed the relevant factors and determined that a reasonable person would 
not have felt that Adeng’s detention during the investigation rose to the level of a 
formal arrest.  (R., pp. 84-85.)  The district court held:  
After engaging in the requisite analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, the Court concludes 
that a reasonable person situated as the defendant would not have 
understood his situation to be akin to arrest.   
 
(R., p. 83.)  
 
The district court also determined that the duration of the questioning did 
not transform the detention into custody.  (R., p. 85.)  The district court 
concluded that the police conduct in this case was “quite typical of non-custodial 
detentions of persons for purposes of investigating reported crimes” and did not 
transform the investigation into custody.  (R., p. 86.)  The district court also 
clarified that Adeng was not placed into handcuffs until after all of his 
incriminating statements were made.  (R., pp. 87-88.)   
After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Adeng went to jury 
trial.  (R., pp. 94-98.)  The jury found Adeng guilty of possession of 
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. 
(R., pp. 131-132, 134.)  The jury found Adeng not guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance, alprazolam.  (R., p. 133.)  The district court entered 
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judgment and sentenced Adeng to seven years with two years fixed.  (R., pp. 
143-147.)  Adeng timely appealed.  (R., pp. 152-155.)   
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ISSUE 
 
Adeng states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Adeng’s motion to 
suppress because he was subject to custodial interrogation in 
violation of Miranda?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Adeng failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress because Adeng was not in custody when the officers questioned 
him?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
Adeng Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion 
To Suppress Statements He Made To The Police 
 
A. Introduction 
After considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court held 
that Adeng was not subjected to “custodial interrogation prior to being given his 
Miranda warnings” and denied Adeng’s motion to suppress.  (R., p. 88.)  Adeng 
disagrees with the district court’s holding and argues that he was “in custody” 
during the police investigation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)   
 Adeng has failed to show the district court erred.  The district court 
properly considered all of the relevant factors and correctly determined that 
Adeng was not in custody during the investigation.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).  
 
C. The District Court Properly Considered All Of The Factors When It 
Determined That Adeng Was Not “In Custody” Such That The Police 
Were Required To Give Miranda Warnings 
 
“[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to 
everyone whom they question.”  Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 
Rather, the warnings are required only when a suspect is subjected to “custodial 
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interrogation.”  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 795 (2009) (the Miranda 
“regime … applies only in the context of custodial interrogation”); Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  In this case Adeng’s admission that he 
possessed a pipe, while given in response to a question, was made prior to his 
arrest, and he was not in custody equivalent to formal arrest.  Thus, Miranda 
warnings were not required and the district court did not err in denying Adeng’s 
motion to suppress the statement. 
An interrogation is “custodial” for purposes of Miranda only where “there is 
a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated 
with a formal arrest.”  California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (internal 
quotes omitted); see also State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576-77, 225 P.3d 
1169, 1171-72 (2010). A mere investigative detention does not trigger the 
requirement of Miranda warnings.  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 
(1984); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576-77, 634 P.2d 435, 438-39 (1981). 
When applying this test the “only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the 
suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 
442; State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002); State v. 
Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999).  
Factors that may be considered include the time and location of the 
interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and manner of the 
questioning, and the presence of other persons.  Albaugh, 133 Idaho at 591, 990 
P.2d at 757; State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. 
App. 1992).  The Idaho Court of Appeals laid out the following factors:   
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Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the 
person’s freedom of movement (including whether the person is 
placed in handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the 
detention is more than temporary, the location and visibility of the 
interrogation, whether other individuals were present, the number 
of questions asked, the duration of the interrogation or detention, 
the time of the interrogation, the number of officers present, the 
number of officers involved in the interrogation, the conduct of the 
officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning. 
 
State v. Beck, 157 Idaho 402, 408, 336 P.3d 809, 815 (Ct. App. 2014) (citation 
omitted).  “The burden of showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to 
exclude evidence based on a failure to administer Miranda warnings.”  State v. 
Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 32, 304 P.3d 304, 307 (Ct. App. 2013).  Adeng failed to 
meet this burden.   
The district court analyzed the relevant factors and determined that Adeng 
was not in custody:   
Applying those precedents, under the facts and 
circumstances attendant to the pre-arrest interrogation that 
occurred in this case, the Court concludes that a reasonable man 
would not have felt his freedom of action to have been curtailed 
akin to a formal arrest. Although the interrogation of the defendant 
occurred late at night, it took place in a well-lit area (i.e. the parking 
lot of a Maverick service station), with the public coming and going 
from the area unimpeded. There were two squad cars on the 
scene, but their emergency lights were not on, and they were not 
physically arranged so as to box the defendant into a confined 
space. The defendant was told to sit on the curb during the period 
of the questioning, and it is conceded he was not free to leave 
during the investigation, but with one brief exception discussed 
below, officers did nothing overt to control or restrict his 
movements. There were three officers on scene in total, but only 
two interacted with the defendant, and the extent to which the 
defendant was conscious of the presence of a third officer is 
unclear from the evidence. The officers’ questioning of the 
defendant and their demeanor while doing so can fairly be 
characterized as firm, persistent, and occasionally blunt, but the 
officers were never discourteous, offensive, or overbearing, 
although it is apparent they had some negative history with the 
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defendant suggesting he would not be cooperative. These factors 
all weigh in favor of the state’s contention that the defendant was 
not in custody during the investigation, prior to being placed in 
handcuffs. 
 
(R., pp. 84-85.)  The district court also held that the duration of the questioning 
was “insufficient to transform the detention into custody, and was reasonable in 
light of the nature of the information known or discovered by the officers in the 
course of speaking with the defendant (i.e. the abandoned purse, the 
subsequent discovery of Ms. Cummings and her injuries, the defendant’s 
disclosure that he struck Ms. Cummings, etc.) and the defendant’s refusal to 
answer very basic questions (such as the identity and location of the person he 
had argued with).”  (R., p. 85 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); 
State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362-63, 17 P.3d 301, 306-07 (Ct. App. 
2000).)  The district court concluded that the police conduct in this case was 
“quite typical of non-custodial detentions of persons for purposes of investigating 
reported crimes” and did not transform the investigation into custody.  (R., p. 86.)  
The district court also clarified that Adeng was not placed into handcuffs until 
after all of his incriminating statements were made.  (R., pp. 87-88.)   
At the hearing, however, it became clear from the officer’s 
unrebutted testimony that the defendant was not actually 
handcuffed until after all incriminating statements were made and 
drug paraphernalia was found on his person.  Subsequent to 
hearing this testimony, the Court again reviewed the recorded 
audio, and it is consistent with the testimony of the officers as to 
when handcuffs were placed on the defendant, although without 
said testimony, it would have been difficult to determine exactly 
when handcuffs were employed.  To remove all doubt as to the 
Court’s finding on this subject, the Court finds that the defendant 
was not placed into handcuffs until after all the evidence at issue in 
this motion was obtained.   
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(R., pp. 87-88 (footnote omitted).)   
On appeal, Adeng does not claim that the district court applied the wrong 
law; instead, Adeng disagrees with the district court’s conclusion.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)  Adeng argues:  
While he had not been formally arrested, Mr. Adeng submits 
that the totality of the circumstances point to Mr. Adeng being in 
custody during the interrogation.  Mr. Adeng was held for over 
thirty-three minutes, was told to sit down on a curb and was not 
allowed to leave the area.  The interrogation took place outside at a 
gas station at 3:30 a.m., while it was dark outside.  Mr. Adeng was 
asked numerous questions over a thirty minute period.  There were 
three officers present and two were involved in the interrogation.   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  Adeng also argues the Court should consider that the 
officers were deceptive in their interview with Adeng.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 
8-9.)  Adeng has failed to show the district court erred.  
 The district court properly considered all of the factors that Adeng raises 
on appeal.  While Adeng was detained during the investigation Adeng was not 
placed in handcuffs.  See, e.g., Beck, 157 Idaho at 408, 336 P.3d at 815 
(defendant not in custody where officers ordered defendant out of a tent and 
ordered defendant to sit during investigation).  The investigation took place in a 
public, well-lit parking lot, and was not the sort of “police-dominated atmosphere” 
that led the Supreme Court to require Miranda warnings.  See Illinois v. Perkins, 
496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (“The warning mandated by Miranda was meant to 
preserve the privilege during incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a 
police-dominated atmosphere.  That atmosphere is said to generate inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and 
to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise freely do so.”) (citations 
  14 
and quotations omitted).  Nor was the length of the detention such that it 
transformed the detention into custody akin to formal arrest.  The officers were 
investigating a report of a physical altercation between a man and woman over a 
purse.  (See R., p. 79.)  The investigation took time in part because Adeng 
“consistently refused to provide the woman’s name or state her whereabouts.”  
(R., p. 80.)  When Cummings was finally discovered after she had locked herself 
in the bathroom, the officers observed recent injuries on her lip.  (R., pp. 80-81.)  
It was reasonable for the officers to continue to detain Adeng while they 
investigated her injury and the circumstances surrounding the reported 
altercation over the purse.  Adeng claims that the officers were deceptive 
because they continued to interrogate him even after they were told by Ms. 
Cummings that nothing happened and that she did not want to pursue charges.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  However, Adeng does not cite any authority that 
supports the proposition that deceptive interrogation techniques transform a non-
custodial investigation into a custodial one.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  It 
was reasonable for the officers to continue to question Adeng considering the 
nature of the potential domestic battery offense, the injury, and the potential of 
an uncooperative domestic battery victim.  The district court accurately summed 
up this case:  
Rather, these facts suggest a course of conduct by police that is 
quite typical of non-custodial detentions of persons for purposes of 
investigating reported crimes, and which has not been held 
sufficient, in the absence of other factors, to transform an 
investigation into custody.   
 
(R., p. 86.)  On appeal, Adeng has failed to show the district court erred.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court 
 DATED this 22nd day of April, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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